The chapter analyzes the practices of the self in the post-pandemic context. Through an engagement with Giorgio Agamben’s controversial work on the attitudes exemplified in the response to the pandemic, and a reading of his work through the prism of philosophical practice, we concluded that the practices of the self – both those with a venerable ancient tradition and their new forms – can become a resource for reinventing a “more modest and simpler form of life”, as an alternative both to the form of life that was taken for granted before the pandemic, and to the problematic aspects of the form of life that appeared in its wake. The ability to discover aspects of this form of life in the midst of everyday experience is an effect of selfreflection embedded in most forms of practices of the self. Several theses can be put forward in this regard. First, one of the “simplest” forms of philosophical practice – simple because it does not require anything else but an availability to see what is happening and commitment to truth – is parrhesia. In the context of the pandemic, resisting the common doxa became extremely risky, as the Agamben controversy shows, but even more necessary, as a revitalization of philosophical discourse. Second, the presence of illness – as a continuous possibility of suffering and death – led to a deeper awareness of the fragility of the human being. This awareness of fragility and vulnerability has clear resonances with the practices of the self. At the same time, we can notice a tendency to present fragility / vulnerability as something to be avoided, something one can defend against, a certain nostalgia for “security” or an attempt to create security through isolation or vaccination. However, from the perspective of philosophical practice, fragility and vulnerabili are constitutive aspects of the human being, thus unavoidable.Third, “social distancing” and using the online environment as a refuge and communication platform generated changes in ways of relating taken for granted before the pandemic. At the same time, these changes are benefic for philosophical practice, offering the isolated subject the possibility to connect to a non-local community interested in practices of the self and the possibility of radical self-awareness in absence of immersion in a physical community and in the everyday routine. Paradoxically, isolation and askesis can become, in the conditions of social distances, mainstream practices. Fourth, the reduction to “bare life” of the complexity of human life – the emphasis on the biological layer – allows a reintegration of the human being’s embodied status, a self-identification as an embodied subject that feels and is able to suffer. This awareness can also generate a new political way of being in the world, based on solidarity and empathy with other subjects, also seen as embodied, feeling, able to suffer. Finally, practices of the self can offer resources for creating an alternative form of life, different both from the one taken for granted before the pandemic, and from the problematic aspects of the changes occasioned by the reaction to the pandemic.