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 SM ISO690:2012UNGUREANU, Valeriu. Sets of Pareto–Nash Equilibria in Dyadic Two-Criterion Mixed-Strategy Games. In: Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies, 1 martie 2018, Berlin. Berlin, Germania: Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH, 2018, Vol.89, pp. 245-254. ISSN 21903018. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75151-1_11 |
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 Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies Vol.89, 2018 |
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Sesiunea "Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies" Berlin, Germania, 1 martie 2018 | ||||||
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| DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75151-1_11 | ||||||
| Pag. 245-254 | ||||||
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In this chapter, the notion of Pareto–Nash equilibrium is investigated as a continuation of the precedent chapter as well as a continuation of prior works (Sagaidac and Ungureanu, Operational research, CEP USM, Chişinău, 296 pp, 2004 (in Romanian), [1]; Ungureanu, Comp Sci J Moldova, 14(3(42)):345–365, 2006, [2]; Ungureanu, ROMAI J, 4(1):225–242, 2008, [3]). First, problems and needed basic theoretical results are exposed. The method of intersection of graphs of best response mappings presented above and initiated in Ungureanu (Comp Sci J Moldova, 14(3(42)):345–365, 2006, [2]) is applied to solve dyadic two-criterion mixed-strategy games. To avoid misunderstanding, some previous results, which are applied in this chapter, are briefly exposed, too. |
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| Cuvinte-cheie Best response, Mixed strategy game, Moldova, Nash equilibria, Operational research, Romanians |
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Dublin Core Export
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?> <oai_dc:dc xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/' xmlns:oai_dc='http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/' xmlns:xsi='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance' xsi:schemaLocation='http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd'> <dc:creator>Ungureanu, V.A.</dc:creator> <dc:date>2018</dc:date> <dc:description xml:lang='en'><p>In this chapter, the notion of Pareto–Nash equilibrium is investigated as a continuation of the precedent chapter as well as a continuation of prior works (Sagaidac and Ungureanu, Operational research, CEP USM, Chişinău, 296 pp, 2004 (in Romanian), [1]; Ungureanu, Comp Sci J Moldova, 14(3(42)):345–365, 2006, [2]; Ungureanu, ROMAI J, 4(1):225–242, 2008, [3]). First, problems and needed basic theoretical results are exposed. The method of intersection of graphs of best response mappings presented above and initiated in Ungureanu (Comp Sci J Moldova, 14(3(42)):345–365, 2006, [2]) is applied to solve dyadic two-criterion mixed-strategy games. To avoid misunderstanding, some previous results, which are applied in this chapter, are briefly exposed, too.</p></dc:description> <dc:source>Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies (Vol.89) 245-254</dc:source> <dc:subject>Best response</dc:subject> <dc:subject>Mixed strategy game</dc:subject> <dc:subject>Moldova</dc:subject> <dc:subject>Nash equilibria</dc:subject> <dc:subject>Operational research</dc:subject> <dc:subject>Romanians</dc:subject> <dc:title>Sets of Pareto–Nash Equilibria in Dyadic Two-Criterion Mixed-Strategy Games</dc:title> <dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</dc:type> </oai_dc:dc>
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