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SM ISO690:2012 UNGUREANU, Valeriu. Sets of Pareto–Nash Equilibria in Dyadic Two-Criterion Mixed-Strategy Games. In: Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies, 1 martie 2018, Berlin. Berlin, Germania: Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH, 2018, Vol.89, pp. 245-254. ISSN 21903018. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75151-1_11 |
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Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies Vol.89, 2018 |
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Sesiunea "Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies" Berlin, Germania, 1 martie 2018 | ||||||
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DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75151-1_11 | ||||||
Pag. 245-254 | ||||||
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In this chapter, the notion of Pareto–Nash equilibrium is investigated as a continuation of the precedent chapter as well as a continuation of prior works (Sagaidac and Ungureanu, Operational research, CEP USM, Chişinău, 296 pp, 2004 (in Romanian), [1]; Ungureanu, Comp Sci J Moldova, 14(3(42)):345–365, 2006, [2]; Ungureanu, ROMAI J, 4(1):225–242, 2008, [3]). First, problems and needed basic theoretical results are exposed. The method of intersection of graphs of best response mappings presented above and initiated in Ungureanu (Comp Sci J Moldova, 14(3(42)):345–365, 2006, [2]) is applied to solve dyadic two-criterion mixed-strategy games. To avoid misunderstanding, some previous results, which are applied in this chapter, are briefly exposed, too. |
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Cuvinte-cheie Best response, Mixed strategy game, Moldova, Nash equilibria, Operational research, Romanians |
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