Articolul precedent |
Articolul urmator |
364 0 |
SM ISO690:2012 DRAGAN, Irinel. On the Coalitional Rationality and the Egalitarian Nonseparable Contribution. In: Proceedings IMCS-55: The Fifth Conference of Mathematical Society of the Republic of Moldova, 28 septembrie - 1 octombrie 2019, Chișinău. Chișinău, Republica Moldova: "VALINEX" SRL, 2019, p. 61. ISBN 978-9975-68-378-4. |
EXPORT metadate: Google Scholar Crossref CERIF DataCite Dublin Core |
Proceedings IMCS-55 2019 | ||||||
Conferința "Conference of Mathematical Society of the Republic of Moldova" Chișinău, Moldova, 28 septembrie - 1 octombrie 2019 | ||||||
|
||||||
Pag. 61-61 | ||||||
|
||||||
Descarcă PDF | ||||||
Rezumat | ||||||
In earlier works, we introduced the Inverse Problem, relative to the Shapley Value, then relative to Semivalues. In the explicit representation of the Inverse Set, the solution set of the Inverse Problem, we built a family of games, called the almost null family, in which we determined more recently a game where the Shapley Value and the Egalitarian Allocation are coalitional rational. The Egalitarian Nonseparable Contribution is another value for cooperative transferable utilities games (TU games), showing how to allocate fairly the win of the grand coalition, in case that this has been formed. In the present paper, we solve the similar problem for this new value: given a nonnegative vector representing the Egalitarian Nonseparable Contribution of a TU game, find out a game in which the Egalitarian Nonseparable Contribution is kept the same, but it is coalitional rational. The new game will belong to the family of almost null games in the Inverse Set, relative to the Shapley Value, and it is proved that the threshold of coalitional rationality will be higher than the one for the Shapley Value. Some numerical examples are illustrating the procedure of finding the new game. |
||||||
Cuvinte-cheie Shapley Value, the Egalitarian Nonseparable Contribution, Inverse Set, Familly of almost null games, Coalitional Rationality |
||||||
|