Despite the fact that during the period between the establishment of the United Nations Coalition and the first personal meeting of the "the big three" at Tehran the USSR, Great Britain and the United States of America had become allies and the joint press releases were regularly announcing the existence of a "close community of interests and total agreement" on military and political issues, their relationship would be marked by serious contradictions. The latter were related to the continued delay of the opening of the second front by the Western allies, insufficient supplies to the USSR, from Soviet perspective, and the reluctance of Western allies to accept the Soviet demands for the recognition of the 1941 Soviet border. As not even the military defeats suffered by the Allies during 1942 had been able to make them overcome their major disagreements, the Allied victories of 1943 brought nothing but the worsening of the interallied contradictions. The possibility of a precipitate defeat of Germany arised though an urgent need for clarifying the intentions and purposes of the Allies during and after the war. Therefore, both, Stalin and its Western allies tried to reach some during the war and postwar settlements. While Roosevelt decided to sacrifice Eastern Europe in favor of a postwar cooperation with the USSR, Stalin deliberately exploited his idealism to obtain gains on the ground, while pressing the West to accept Soviet claims in Eastern Europe and Far East.