| Articolul precedent |
| Articolul urmator |
 |
 335 6 |
| Ultima descărcare din IBN: 2024-02-20 16:13 |
| Căutarea după subiecte similare conform CZU |
| 342.511.3(478+100) (1) |
| Power of the state. System and function of organs of government (415) |
 SM ISO690:2012BALABAN, Mihai. Aspecte comparative privind suspendarea și încetarea mandatului Președintelui în Republica Moldova și alte state. In: State, security and human rights: in digital era, 8-9 decembrie 2021, Chişinău. Chişinău: Centrul Editorial-Poligrafic al USM, 2022, pp. 76-82. ISBN 978-9975-159-32-6. 10.5281/zenodo.6393014 |
| EXPORT metadate: Google Scholar Crossref CERIF DataCite Dublin Core |
| State, security and human rights 2022 | ||||||
|
Conferința "Statul, securitatea şi drepturile omului în era digitală" Chişinău, Moldova, 8-9 decembrie 2021 | ||||||
|
||||||
| CZU: 342.511.3(478+100) | ||||||
| Pag. 76-82 | ||||||
|
||||||
 Descarcă PDF |
||||||
| Rezumat | ||||||
This article aims to highlight the mechanisms for avoiding constitutional bottlenecks, in particular if the head of state refuses to fulfill his constitutional duties. Thus, the political will of the heads of state cannot be a source of institutional deadlock. To remove constitutional bottlenecks Both the Parliament and the Prime Minister are to use the instruments expressly established by the provisions of the Basic Law, in particular the suspension of the Head of State and the establishment of an interim function. Therefore, the application of government reshuffles is a solution to eliminate institutional bottlenecks, given that there are currently no alternative mechanisms to overcome a possible institutional deadlock. |
||||||
| Cuvinte-cheie constitutional deadlock, Head of State, suspension, interim, constitution |
||||||
|
|
|
|
