

General-Conceptual Aspects Regarding the Modernization of Motor Action Theory in Sport

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Abstract: The motor action is the most important object of study in the sports sciences, where most of the times is analyzed in terms of positivism. It is found that such an analysis is generally constructive; however on the general-conceptual level is insufficient. The philosophical-anthropological approach, where the motor action is researched as a human act performed on a large scale is much more appropriate. This approach allows studying the basic particularities of the motor action, where in the sports sciences, usually remain out of the way of researcher attention: the spontaneity of the motor activity, the ethical character of the space where the motor action is performed, etc. In the article, the opinion on the necessity and possibility of the modernization of sports sciences is argued from philosophical-anthropological approach point of view.

Keywords: *motor action, modernization of sport sciences.*

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In sport sciences, the motor action is methodologically analyzed, especially in terms of natural sciences - the positivism. Generally, such an analysis is productive; however, on the general-conceptual level is insufficient. First of all, the *moral-spiritual* meaning of the action is diminished, its personality component is reduced and, as a consequence, its motivational potential as a whole is limited. In this context, Merleau-Ponty mentioned: "In order for man can make use of scientific knowledge in building his own motor action, it in turn, must adjust with the body" (Merleau-Ponty, 1999, p.194). This is possible, *de facto*, only if this knowledge will be subjected to philosophical, phenomenological requirements and corrections (Merleau-Ponty, 1999, p.585). The scientific theory regarding the motor action of the individual practicing sports implies, first of all, the fact that in this action we will try to see a complete act of human behavior, a *human fact*, which represents, undoubtedly, the respective action. Bakhtin stated, in this sense, "The physical action of man must be understood as *an act...*" (Bakhtin, 1986, p.99). It is essential that, in philosophical anthropology, in its turn, the act is often understood as a reality based on motor action. Thus, Gelen stated: "The sought-after starting point represents the action. The structure of general anthropology, starting from action, brings with it its hypothesis and its confirmation, that the whole human organization can be understood starting from the action" (Gelen, 1988, pp. 160-162). Any approach, any analysis, aspiring to the outline of the full picture of the analyzed object, in the case of the motor action, as in the one of each cognitive situation, leads to philosophical research.

Methods and organization of research: in the article, within a *philosophical-anthropological* approach, *the* problem of modernizing the theory of motor action in sports is analyzed.

Research results. The act, the *act-action* is not a physical reality, neither biological, nor even psychological, but a *metaphysical* (philosophical) one. The main event, in this case, is the ethical relationship, the "I - the other" relationship. E. Levinas stated: "The ethical space represents the space of the existence of the human essence" (Levinas, 2003, p. 546). Therefore, "man does not concentrate unless certain philosophical acts are committed, whether man knows this act or not", rightly observe Zinchenko and Mamardashvili (1987, p. 120). Philosophical anthropology states that man is a *triple* phenomenon. In Plessner's view, "Man lives as a soul, as a body, and as a psycho physiological unit of these spheres" (Plessner, 1988, p.127). The action is also attributed to man as a trinity: 1) as an *external* reality - in the sense of the environment: as something that happens to someone else, *outside the Ego*; 2) as an *internal* reality - in the sense of the body: as something

that happens *in me*; 3) *as transcendental reality*—the middle in the sense of the Ego: as something that happens *to me*. Thus, the action has *three sources of activity*: 1) external influence - the action can be triggered by *the environment*; 2) the inner experiences - *of the body*; 3) spontaneous activity - from the transcendental space, *from the border between outside and inside*, from the sphere of their mutual overlap. About the latter case, it is usually referred to as a situation of initiation of action by the human consciousness, which is, in factis a somewhat imprecise statement. S. Rubinstein mentioned: "Consciousness is not an external force that directs the action of man from outside. Being a premise of activity, consciousness is at the same time its result" (Rubinstein, 1999, p. 145). Zinchenko & Mamardashvili emphasize: "When we postulate, from the very beginning, the existence of consciousness, that directs action, we lose sight of a fundamental act, that of the self-action of everything that lives among things" (Zinchenko & Mamardashvili, 1987, p. 120). Consequently, the rhetorical question of Reed is well founded: "Is the conception that the central nervous system schedules the directing of the body more than a metaphor without content (or wrong)?" (Reed, 1990, p.127). In this way, the action is born and takes place *at the border*, from the "outer-inner" tangency point. Bakhtin: "Man does not have his own inner territory, he is always, entirely at the border. Looking inside, he looks into the eyes of the other and with the eyes of the other" (Bakhtin, 1979, p. 320). Finally, this is the "I - the other" encounter.

In the psychological and sports literature, the importance of the encounter *the effective conjugation* of the "sense of environment" and "sense of the body", are acknowledged to a great extent, in order to successfully achieve the motor action (Bernstein, 1990, p. 375; Gordeeva, 1995, p. 244). In most cases, however, researchers often miss namely that, behind the relationship between environment and body always is the relationship *I – the other*. As a result, the transcendental element of the respective conjugation proves to be lost, and, as a consequence, the complex representation of the mechanisms for carrying out the action, that take place and which the philosophical anthropology is speaking is not appropriately used. An essential shortcoming of modern conceptions of motor action in the sports sciences is the assumption that the muscular apparatus is prepared from the degree of functional-architectural representation point of view, on the one hand, and that the system putting the muscular apparatus into action and directs it , on the other hand, exist even before the actual action is performed and is just as prepared. At the same time, Galperin emphasizes, absolutely justified: "For a new action, in general, there are neither ready mechanisms inside the organism, nor exciting factors in the environment"

(Galperin, 1985, p. 4). Only if the motor action will be understood as the essential factor that reveals the realities of the internal and external world, forming the element in which the respective action is performed, that would allow a methodologically correct analysis to be carried out, a system developed of notions, to adequately represent what is happening. Zinchenko and Mamardashvili state: "There must be notions that refer to the work on the real structure of the studied action. And it is wonderful that these are not notions that describe the work of the "Ego" (neither of the Ego of the person subject to investigation, nor of the Ego of the researcher). [...] it is an attempt to conventionally indicate the self-action of everything that lives among things there, in the world of objects. [...] The movement, like the psychic, is self-constructing and self-developing" (Zinchenko & Mamardashvili, 1987, p. 117). Thus, it is impossible to understand the motor action without a repeated ideomotor reproduction, namely without immersing the Ego in its real history, just as it is impossible to effectively execute the motor action without gaining, again and again, the moral consciousness and sense in its story.

When analyzing the motor action of the athlete, it is necessary to ignore the fact that sport is an activity that reproduces, in a more acute form, the contradictory inner moral-psychological situation of *human self-affirmation*, which, internally, from a moral-psychological point of view is always contradictory. The athlete is actively oriented towards his own success, towards *individualization*. However, he can ensure this to the full extent only by actively putting into action the principle of *identity of the competitors*, namely harmonizing with all the other participants in the competition. These two aspects are mutually conditioned, the existence of one being impossible without the other. I cannot live my own *uniqueness* without depersonalizing myself in a certain sense, just as I cannot at present live my fundamental *belonging* to the community, to the *socium*, without obtaining within it a high individual status, determined by the dimensions of my ability to be a factor in asserting its existence. P. Tillich mentioned: "Self-affirmation as an individual Self always implies the affirmation of that force of existence to which the Self participates. The Self asserts itself as a participant in the force of a group, of a movement, essence world, self-existence (Tillich, 1998, p. 65). It is essential that all the indicated semantic constants are reflected in the particularities of structuring the motor action of the athlete and the functional mechanisms, ensuring its realization. In particular, my tendency to defeat my opponent is always current and involves not only distance, but also contact - my conjugation, a kind of unity with him, where our mutual penetration, the permissive attitude towards the actions of the other is

ensured, a specific combination, within each one of us, of the "external" and "internal" in one point". The meaning of each movement is ultimately its *moral meaning*. Nietzsche, speaking about the "moral dimension" of man, about the extent to which human existence is encompassed by the spiritual relationship, notes: "For the moment, we are constructing a new and visible image with the help of all our previous experiences only to the extent of our honesty and fairness. *There are no experiences other than moral ones, not even in the sphere of sensory perception*" (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 176). Namely, the fact that I feel what happens in the process of the motor action as a moral act ensures its real achievement and represents the basis of its maximum practical effectiveness, in the most general sense of the word.

Conclusions. Competitive activity requires the athlete maximum volitional efforts and a special working regime of his conscience, that, in this case, directs volitional efforts towards *maintaining a spontaneous regime* of motor action, involving to focus attention on integral, *meditative experiences*, of the "sense of water" type in swimmers. Basically, under the above mentioned, it is a moral experience, a living experience of the "I - the other" relationship. The main enigma of the athlete's motor action lies in gaining the ability to try such experiences. This is, to a large extent, the mystery of human existence itself, which it tends to reveal, over and over again, in philosophical anthropology. Merleau-Ponty, in this sense, argues: "The body itself interprets. "Visual information" appears in it from the point of view of their tactile sense, the tactile ones – in terms of the visual sense" (Merleau-Ponty, 1999, pp. 200-201). The science of sport, if it had a correct methodological orientation, could take over much of the philosophical anthropology, which, in turn, could include, to a greater and more efficient extent, in its area of concern, the rich factological material available to the science of sport and the genuine sports experience in the field of motor action.

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