Stationary nash equilibria for average stochastic positional games
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LOZOVANU, Dmitrii. Stationary nash equilibria for average stochastic positional games. In: Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. 8 octombrie 2018, berlin. Berlin, Germania: Birkhauser, 2018, pp. 139-163.
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Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications 2018
Sesiunea "Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications"
berlin, Germany, 8 octombrie 2018

Stationary nash equilibria for average stochastic positional games

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92988-0_9

Pag. 139-163

Lozovanu Dmitrii
 
Vladimir Andrunachievici Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science
 
Disponibil în IBN: 7 decembrie 2021


Rezumat

An average stochastic positional game is a stochastic game with average payoffs in which the set of states is divided into several disjoint subsets such that each subset represents the position set for one of the player and each player controls the Markov process only in his position set. In such a game each player chooses actions in his position set in order to maximize his average reward per transition. We show that an arbitrary average stochastic positional game possesses a stationary Nash equilibrium. Based on this result we propose an approach for determining the optimal stationary strategies of the players.