﻿ ﻿﻿ Stationary Nash Equilibria for Average Stochastic Games with Finite State and Action Spaces
 Conţinutul numărului revistei Articolul precedent Articolul urmator 769 7 Ultima descărcare din IBN: 2019-12-24 15:01 Căutarea după subiecte similare conform CZU 519.217 (12) Probabilitate. Statistică matematică (74) SM ISO690:2012LOZOVANU, Dmitrii. Stationary Nash Equilibria for Average Stochastic Games with Finite State and Action Spaces. In: Buletinul Academiei de Ştiinţe a Moldovei. Matematica. 2016, nr. 2(81), pp. 71-92. ISSN 1024-7696. EXPORT metadate: Google Scholar Crossref CERIF DataCiteDublin Core
Buletinul Academiei de Ştiinţe a Moldovei. Matematica
Numărul 2(81) / 2016 / ISSN 1024-7696

 Stationary Nash Equilibria for Average Stochastic Games with Finite State and Action Spaces
CZU: 519.217

Pag. 71-92

 Lozovanu Dmitrii Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science ASM Proiect:INTAS Marker-assisted breeding of new seedless grapevine varieties with resistance to stressful environmental conditions Disponibil în IBN: 28 octombrie 2016

Rezumat

We study the problem of the existence of stationary Nash equilibria in infinite n-person stochastic games with limiting average payoff criteria for the players. The state and action spaces in the games are assumed to be finite. We present some results for the existence of stationary Nash equilibria in a multichain average stochastic game with n players. Based on constructive proof of these results we propose an approach for determining the optimal stationary strategies of the players in the case when stationary Nash equilibria in the game exist

Cuvinte-cheie
Markov decision processes, Stochastic games, Average payoffs, Optimal strategies.,

Stationary Nash equilibria

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