This study is an attempt to dwell on the reference’s problem against the possible worlds. Starting from the assumption that there are several versions of reality, the so-called worlds of imagination, of fiction and myth were conceptualized, worlds where the referential identity is more difficult to establish. Various solutions have been proposed to identify the referent in the possible worlds. It is certainly that the theory of the possible worlds broaches the reference in terms of modal logic so that its object of research is the modality as logic, philosophical and linguistic phenomenon. In terms of modality, there is no certainty that what is said is really so in all the possible worlds, in other words we can’t speak of referential identity in all the cases. In the article a particular attention is given to the difference between the referentiality of proper names, of names of classes and species on the one hand, and of the fictional names, on the other hand. The firsts signify even without a sense, because they appoint the same object in all the possible worlds. The fictional names designate different objects in different possible worlds, and nonexistent objects. Therefore their identification is made on the basis of specific features.