Russian territorial consciousness extends beyond the country’s present borders and “Russia” and “Russian identity” are not confined within the space of the present Russian Federation. Historically accustomed with the large territory and the “absence” of borders, Russia continues to look at the post-Soviet space as to something relative and possible of changing, suitable to be returned to the Russian “core”. From this point of view the primordiality of territoriality prevails in the post-Soviet Russian history and politics The case of Georgia suddenly opened the issue of the territorial integrity in the post-Soviet states as a tool of the Russian foreign policy strategies, especially in the similar case of Transnistrian separatist republic of Moldova and in the case of the probably similar scenario of the Ukrainian region of Crimea. The invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the official recognition of separatist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by the Russian Federation showed explicitly the linkage between Russian policy in the “Near Abroad” and the commitment to rebuilding the country’s great power status. The Georgian case is the first successful one for Russia in using territorial integrity in a combining strategy of security, neo-imperial ambitions and great power stance looking for international affirmation as regional and world power. But in long term strategy the official recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by the Russian Federation was a demonstration of incapacity of the Russian political elite to transform the post-Soviet space according to the modern principle of influence and power. The 26 August 2008 act attested the Russian old imperial paradigm of action in the post-Soviet space adapted to new realities – the separation and annexation o new territories. Could be expected the similar scenario in the different cases of Ukraine and Republic of Moldova? The logic of Russian political action suggests that the Russian Federation has no other strategies at the moment rather than eroding the territorial integrity of the neighboring states for achieve its geopolitical goals. The Russian behavior in the “Near Abroad” attests that Kremlin is content to allow Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova their internal sovereignty and to grant their territorial integrity, so long as they do not become a threat to Russia and do not pose challenges to its perception of these states as part of the Russian “vital space”.