Postoptimal analysis of a finite cooperative game
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2022-02-21 17:54
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519.8 (173)
Cercetări operaționale (OR) teorii şi metode matematice (170)
SM ISO690:2012
EMELICHEV, Vladimir, KARELKINA, Olga. Postoptimal analysis of a finite cooperative game. In: Buletinul Academiei de Ştiinţe a Republicii Moldova. Matematica, 2021, nr. 1-2(95-96), pp. 121-136. ISSN 1024-7696.
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Buletinul Academiei de Ştiinţe a Republicii Moldova. Matematica
Numărul 1-2(95-96) / 2021 / ISSN 1024-7696 /ISSNe 2587-4322

Postoptimal analysis of a finite cooperative game

CZU: 519.8
MSC 2010: 90C10, 90C29.

Pag. 121-136

Emelichev Vladimir1, Karelkina Olga2
 
1 Belarusian State University,
2 Systems Research Institute
 
 
Disponibil în IBN: 3 decembrie 2021


Rezumat

We consider a finite cooperative game of several players with parameterized concept of equilibrium (optimality principles), when relations between players in coalition are based on the Pareto maximum. Introduction of this optimality principle allows to connect classical notions of the Pareto optimality and Nash equilibrium. Lower and upper bounds are obtained for the strong stability radius of the game under parameters perturbations with the assumption that arbitrary H¨older norms are defined in the space of outcomes and criteria space. Game classes with an infinite radius are defined.

Cuvinte-cheie
multiple criteria, strong stability radius, parametric optimality, Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimality, H¨older norm