Articolul precedent |
Articolul urmator |
349 4 |
Ultima descărcare din IBN: 2022-10-17 08:55 |
Căutarea după subiecte similare conform CZU |
004.8 (315) |
Inteligență artificială (312) |
SM ISO690:2012 ALVARADO, Ramon. Machine guessing, pigeon superstition and trust in AI. In: Şcoala internaţională de metodologie în ştiinţele socioumane: Dezvoltarea personală și educația pentru societate: temeiuri epistemologice actuale, 19-20 noiembrie 2020, Chişinău. Chișinău, Republica Moldova: Universitatea de Stat din Moldova, 2020, Ediția a 4-a, pp. 97-98. ISBN 978-9975-152-62-4. |
EXPORT metadate: Google Scholar Crossref CERIF DataCite Dublin Core |
Şcoala internaţională de metodologie în ştiinţele socioumane Ediția a 4-a, 2020 |
||||||
Conferința "Şcoala internaţională de metodologie în ştiinţele socioumane" Chişinău, Moldova, 19-20 noiembrie 2020 | ||||||
|
||||||
CZU: 004.8 | ||||||
Pag. 97-98 | ||||||
|
||||||
Descarcă PDF | ||||||
Rezumat | ||||||
In this paper I argue that the predictive prowess of artificial intelligence methods, such as machine learning, is not sufficient as an epistemic warrant for us to allocate trust in them. This is because of two reasons: 1) they are opaque in ways that other methodology is not and 2) they fail in ways that other methodology does not. In order to motivate my analysis, I compare the prowess of some machine learning methodology in image recognition to the ability for pattern identification by some animals, such as pigeons, and suggest that while useful in certain practical circumstances, their success does not constitute the kinds of epistemic warrants that we should aim for in more epistemically demanding contexts such as science, medicine, and/or policy-making. |
||||||
Cuvinte-cheie artificial intelligence methods, machine learning, epistemic warrant, pattern identification |
||||||
|